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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA: WHY SOUTH
AFRICA SHOULD NOT FOLLOW IN OUR
FOOTSTEPS*
I. INTRODUCTION
They were . . . considered a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race... so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect.I
It is from this history that the United States sought to redeem itself
through the use of affirmative action programs. Now South Africa will
have to travel down a similar road, but hopefully with more insight. The
use of race-conscious affirmative action measures to achieve equality when
race-neutral remedial measures fail has been controversial in both the
United States and South Africa.' The controversy is fueled by the
underlying premise that such programs require people to be treated
unequally.3 Both countries' commitment to the principles of equality and
equal protection makes the application and interpretation of the
Constitutional right to equality difficult in the affirmative action context.4
As a result, both countries face the dilemma of promoting group
advancement without trampling individual rights.
* The author would like to thank Professor Stephen Ellmann for all of his help and
guidance in writing this note.
1. Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 405, 407 (1856). (Mr. Chief Justice
Taney delivered the opinion of the court).
2. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Race Relations Law in a Reformed South Africa, 10
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 117, 125 (1993).
3. Brian Currin & Johan Kruger, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993: a Brief Contextualization, in
INTERPRETING A BILL OF RiGHTs 137 (1994).
4. Id.
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The tension between group advancement and individual rights is at the
heart of the affirmative action debate. The different histories and social
dynamics of these countries have led to different interpretations of
Constitutional protections and guarantees. 5 Different interpretations of the
right to equality are reflected in the text and the spirit of both
Constitutions,6 and different approaches to constitutional analysis do not
always produce the same result.'
Differential treatment based on reasonable grounds does not offend the
principle of equality.' However, to be permissible, unequal treatment must
meet Constitutional requirements. 9 Programs designed to redress past
imbalances and ameliorate the condition of historically disadvantaged
individuals and groups are one way to achieve equality while
acknowledging differences.° However, affirmative action programs pit
group advancement against individual rights. In societies that find the need
to compensate for past injustice, such as the United States and South Africa,
the use of racial classifications is a sensitive subject."
In the United States, the history of affirmative action reflects the
struggle to define discrimination and implement programs to counteract its
effects. 2 The debate has focused on the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. 3 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been used to support and oppose the legality of affirmative action
programs." The United States Supreme Court's equal protection analysis
imposes different levels of scrutiny on different categories of legislative
classification. Race-conscious measures designed to benefit traditionally
disadvantaged groups are subject to the same stringent level of scrutiny as
5. See S. v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 100. '",
6. Compare U.S. CONST. preamble, amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2, with S. AFR. CONST.
preamble, ch. 1, § (1), ch. 2, § (9).
7. Makwanyane at 100.
8. Currin & Kruger, supra note 3, at 137.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 138.
11. Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in
American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1953,
2015 (1996).
12. Nicholas Smith, Affirmative Action: Its Origin and Points, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs.
234, 239 (1992).




legislation that discriminates against members of disadvantaged groups. 5
This narrow construction of the Equal Protection Clause has undermined its
effectiveness for achieving racial equality. 6
South African affirmative action programs operate in a different
constitutional context than in the United States. '7 The South African
Constitution, unlike its United States counterpart, expressly permits the use
of "measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. "18 South African Courts
may look to United States' equal protection and affirmative action
jurisprudence as one source of guidance, 9 but are unlikely to adopt our
categories of equal protection scrutiny. 2° The South African Constitutional
Court has a clearer set of guidelines to follow when determining the
constitutionality of potential affirmative action legislation.2' The approach
adopted by the South African Constitutional Court should reflect South
Africa's different racial experience, history, and constitutional text.
22
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court's equal protection and affirmative
action jurisprudence has been inconsistent. 2" The Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law"24 and this
principle is applied to the federal government through the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.25 To protect this Constitutional guarantee,
the Supreme Court formulated three tiers of scrutiny for equal protection
15. Nadine Strossen, Translating a Bill of Rights' Paper Guarantees into Meaningful
Human Rights Protection, in INTERPRETING A BILL OF RIGHTS 57 (1994).
16. Id.
17. Ford, supra note 11, at 1956.
18. S. AFR. CONST. (1996), ch. 2, § 9(2).
19. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36; WILLIAM BEINART, TWENTIETH-CENTURYSOUTH AFRICA
217 (1994).
20. See Currin & Kruger, supra note 3, at 138.
21. See S. AFR. CONST. ch.2, §§ 36, 39.
22. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism In American And South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 489 (1990).
23. Holly Dyer, Comment, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does It Fit in the
Tiered Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 41 KAN. L. REv. 591, 591 (1993).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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analysis; rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. 26
The level of scrutiny applied depends on the classification at issue.27
Suspect classifications, such as race, are subject to strict scrutiny, which
mandates that the classification be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest.28
A. Justification for Strict Scrutiny
In the years subsequent to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court began to realize that the minimal scrutiny
afforded by rational basis review provided inadequate protection against
racial discrimination.29 Justice Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States
v. Carolene Products3" suggested that legislation directed at racial
minorities might be subject to a more exacting level of scrutiny. 3
Subsequently, the Court developed a strict scrutiny standard for suspect
classifications.32 In Korematsu v. United States,33 the Court noted that "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect and must be subject to the most rigid scrutiny.,,
34
The application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications was originally
adopted based on the group treatment theory set forth by the Carolene
Court's "discrete and insular minority" requirement. 35 The group treatment
theory is concerned with a group's political powerlessness and historical
subjection to prejudice and discrimination. 36 African-Americans and other
racial minorities in the United States have less political representation than
majority groups and have generally suffered past discrimination.37




30. "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends to seriously curtail the operation of those political process ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." U.S. v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
31. Dyer, supra note 23, at 593 n.21.
32. Id. at 593.
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
34. Id. at 216.
35. Dyer, supra note 23, at 595.




Therefore, in order to provide minorities with equal protection of the laws,
racial classifications must be subject to heightened scrutiny.3"
In an effort to further protect minority rights, federal, state, and local
governments began passing laws to benefit groups who were adversely
affected by past discrimination.39 The implementation of such programs
complicated equal protection analysis.' The application of strict scrutiny
to racial classifications was developed to combat classifications aimed at
burdening groups that have suffered discrimination. 4 However, one of the
major justifications for affirmative action legislation is compensation for
historical abuse. 42 The question became whether race-based governmental
action designed to benefit groups should also be subject to strict scrutiny.
43
The application of different levels of scrutiny to affirmative action
measures has created division in the Supreme Court and lower courts.' For
instance, the Court's lack of consensus on the proper standard of review to
be applied to benign racial classifications is evidenced by two decades of
plurality and dissenting opinions.45 Finally, the Supreme Court in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena held that all racial classifications imposed by
federal, state, or local government must be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 
6
Under this latest pronouncement on affirmative action by the Supreme
Court, "all race-based affirmative action programs are subject to strict
scrutiny even though their purpose is to remedy the effect of past racial
discrimination. "' What an affirmative action program would need to
survive strict scrutiny still remains unclear.4"
38. Id.
39. Id. at 599.
40. Id. at 599.
41. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 208 (1995).
42. J. HARviE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN To BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION 1954-1978 274 (1976).
43. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 208.
44. Dyer, supra note 23, at 598.
45. Karen B. Dietrich, Federal Affirmative Action After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1259, 1260, 1270 (1996).
46. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212.
47. Dyer, supra note 23, at 591.
48. Dietrich, supra note 45, at 1286.
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III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa's history of racial disadvantage, segregation, and
discrimination under the Apartheid system motivated the drafting of a
constitution founded on principles of non-racialism and equality. Under the
Apartheid system, many groups were deliberately and systematically
excluded from meaningful participation in South African society and
economy.49 Now the South African government must find a way to re-
incorporate those previously disadvantaged groups. The most obvious way
to accomplish this task is to implement some form of affirmative action
policy. The framers of the South African Constitution contemplated such
a remedy. 50 However, the contours of permissible affirmative action
measures have yet to be defined. The Constitutional Court must determine
the degree to which programs designed to advance those disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination may be undertaken, without conflicting with the
Constitution's core principle of equality."
There are several ways for the Constitutional Court to approach the
issue of affirmative action within South Africa's Constitutional framework.
This section will briefly set out the Constitutional provisions that are
relevant to the affirmative action question. The principles of rights
interpretation defined by the Constitutional Court will then be discussed.
These principles will then be applied to the relevant provisions to conclude
that even if affirmative action is considered unfair discrimination, the Court
should find that such measures are a permissible limitation of the right to
equality.
A. Relevant Provisions
"Equality has a very special place in the South African Constitution."
52
The affirmation of the principle of equality can be found throughout the text
of the South African Constitution. A Constitution that is intended to
acknowledge South Africa's past institutionalized inequality and provide a
framework to promote equality. 53  The framers of the Constitution
recognized the past injustices and continued effects of "systematic patterns
49. Ford, supra note 11, at 1978-79.
50. S. AFR. CONST. ch.2, § 9(2).
51. Ford, supra note 11, at 1968.
52. Brink v. Kitshoff NO, 1996 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 33. See S. AFR. CONST.
preamble, ch. 1, § 1, ch. 2, §§ 7(1), 9, 36, 39.
53. See S. AFR. CONST. preamble, ch. 1, § 1; Bink at 33.
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of discrimination."s" Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights to the South African
Constitution, contains several provisions relevant to the issue of affirmative
action.
"Section [9, the equality provision,] was adopted in the recognition that
discrimination against members of [disfavored] groups can lead to patterns
of group disadvantage and harm."55 Therefore, section 9 is a product of
South Africa's particular history and was intended to "proscribe such forms
of discrimination and permit positive steps to redress its effect."5 6 Its
interpretation is based on the specific language of the clause in
constitutional context and in light of South African history.57
The South African Constitution also contains a general limitations
clause.58 Section 36 of the Constitution permits the limitation of
Constitutional rights only to the extent that it is "reasonable and justifiable
in an open democratic society based on . . . equality and freedom." 59
Section 36 also sets out several factors that must be considered when
assessing the permissibility of a limitation upon a constitutional right."
Finally, section 39 provides guidelines for courts interpreting the rights
incorporated in the Bill of Rights.6'
B. Interpreting the Bill of Rights
The South African Constitutional Court interprets rights broadly by
analyzing the purpose of the right as well as the interest protected by that
right.62 The purpose of a right must be determined with reference to the
"broader objectives and underlying values and commitments of the
Constitution, the text of the provision conferring the right, the historical
origins of the right, and the meaning and purpose of associated rights."63
The South African Constitution also contains a general limitations clause,
which contemplates the ability of the state to limit the rights entrenched in
54. Brink at 41.
55. Id. at 42.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 40
58. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36.
59. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1).
60. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2, § 36(1)(a)-(e).
61. S. AFR. CONsr. ch. 2, § 39.
62. S. v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at 9.
63. Janet Kentridge & Derek Spitz, Interpretation, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA 11-6 (1996).
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Chapter 2. 1 To be permissible, limitations must meet the criteria set out
in the provision. In assessing legislative measures under this interpretive
framework, two questions must be asked: Does the legislation implicate a
constitutional right and, if so, is it a permissible limitation? 65 This "two-
stage approach" calls for "a broad rather than a narrow interpretation" of
constitutional rights and justification of limitations "through the application
of section [36]."66
To determine whether a legislative act affects a constitutionally
protected right, the right must initially be broadly interpreted. 67 The
constitutional provision dealing with rights interpretation provides that a
court "must promote the values underlying an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. " 61 If a constitutionally
protected right is affected, then any imposed limitations must meet the
criteria set out in the limitations clause to be permissible. 69 Section 36
provides that a right may only be limited by a "law of general application,"
and the limitation must be "reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.... 70
Thus, the obligation to "promote the values underlying an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom" 7' applies
to both stages of constitutional analysis.72
The determination of a permissible limitation under section 36 involves
a proportional balancing of competing values. 71 "An open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality" attaches varying degrees of
significance to different rights.74 Therefore, it is difficult to articulate an
absolute standard to determine reasonableness." The Court can only
formulate general principles and apply them to particular circumstances on
a case by case basis, as in the United States. 76 In balancing competing
64. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36.
65. Makwanyane at 100; Kentridge & Spitz, supra note 63, at 11-33.
66. Makwanyane at 100.
67. See Makwanyane at 100; Kentridge & Spitz, supra note 63, at 11-32.
68. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39(1)(a); Kentridge & Spitz, supra note 63, at 11-33.
69. Makwanyane at 102-103.
70. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1).
71. S. AFR. CONST. ch.2, § 39(1)(a).
72. Kentridge & Spitz, supra note 63, at 11-7.
73. Makwanyane at 104; Kentridge & Spitz, supra note 63, at 11-34.





rights, values, and social and political objectives, the criteria prescribed by
section 36 must be taken into account.77 Relevant considerations include:
the purpose and importance of the limitation, the nature and extent of the
limitation, the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, and the
availability of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose of the
limitation.78
The United States and South Africa use similar approaches to balancing
competing constitutionally protected rights. However, in contrast to the
South African Constitution, the United States Constitution does not
expressly reserve such a power of rights limitation.79 Instead such a power
is implicit in the balancing of state and individual interests to determine the
validity of a state imposed limitation on a constitutionally protected right.
By necessity, such a balancing test imposes a limitation on one interest to
accommodate another. The South African "two stage" approach of
constitutional analysis seems to protect rights against state interference more
effectively, because all limitations must meet the criteria in section 36.
C. Is Affirmative Action Unfair Discrimination?
Legislation that discriminates based on race is a breach of the equality
principle. However, the Constitutional Court will uphold such
discriminatory legislation if it falls under section 9, which permits the use
of "measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination" 0 or under section 36,
which permits justified limitations."' The Equality Clause prohibits unfair
discrimination only, and unless it is established to be fair, presumes that all
discrimination is unfair.82 Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between
fair and unfair discrimination. "The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'to
discriminate against' was 'to make an adverse distinction with regard to or
to distinguish unfavorably from others.'"83 Although the Court maintains
that all discrimination is fundamentally unfair, a different meaning had was
77. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1); Makwanyane at 104; Kentridge & Spitz, supra note
63, at 11-34.
78. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1)(a)-(e); Makwanyane at 104.
79. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36.
80. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(2).
81. Brink at 44.
82. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
83. Hugo v. State President of the Republic of South Africa and Another, 1996 (6) BCLR
876 (D), 1996 SACLR Lexis 16 at 25-27.
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given to the word "unfair" in the context of section 9.' The Court has
construed the word "unfair" to mean unreasonable.' Therefore, a
discriminatory classification may not be unreasonable. Accordingly,
affirmative action programs may be fair and reasonable discrimination.
Under Section 9, the permission to adopt affirmative action measures may
be interpreted as a justification for discrimination. Such a finding would
eliminate the need to assess the permissibility of such a limitation on the
constitutionally protected right to equality.
However, finding that affirmative action programs are reasonable and
fair presents another problem. How will the Court determine that an
affirmative action program fits within the terms of section 9(2)? It is
unlikely that the Court will find all affirmative action programs permissible.
At the very least, such measures must be aimed at protecting or advancing
persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair or unreasonable
discrimination. This will necessarily involve an inquiry into purpose and
reasonableness. As a practical matter, it may be difficult to develop a test to
determine whether an affirmative action program fits within the terms of
section 9(2). Any test developed by the Constitutional Court to determine
the permissibility of affirmative action measures under section 9(2), will
require a determination of fairness. Even if the Court interprets section 9(2)
as a permissible ground for unequal treatment in and of itself, it must still
determine if the measures were adopted to combat "unfair discrimination."
Given the required circular analysis and the practical difficulties of
determining whether an affirmative action program fits within the terms of
section 9(2), combined with the fact that South African Constitutional
analysis calls for broad rather than narrow interpretation of fundamental
rights,86 affirmative action programs are likely to be considered unfair
discrimination and therefore a limitation on the right to equality. This
conclusion is also supported by the Constitutional presumption that all
discrimination is unfair unless it is established otherwise. 7 As a result, the
Court is unlikely to allow this right to be limited without adequate inquiry
into the purpose, means, and importance of the limitation.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Makwanyane at 100.
87. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(4).
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D. Affirmative Action is a Justifiable Limitation
Although the Court is unlikely to find a blanket exemption for all
affirmative action programs, affirmative action programs that meet the
criteria of section 36 will be permissible. The Court will have to fashion a
test to determine the Constitutionality of potential affirmative action
programs. In doing so, the Court must consider the text of the affirmative
action provision, the history that necessitated the inclusion of this provision,
and "the meaning and purpose of associated rights."88 The Court must
further consider the importance of promoting group advancement and
achieving equality, and the extent to which proposed affirmative action
measures are likely to achieve these goals.
1. Constitutional Endorsement of Affirmative Action
Unlike the United States Constitution, the South African Constitution
expressly endorses affirmative action. 9 The preamble of the South African
Constitution provides that it "recogni~zes] the injustices of Ithel past," the
need to "heal the divisions of the past, . .. improve the quality of life of all
citizens, and free the potential of each person."9 These mandates, along
with the Equality provision's permission to adopt legislative and other
measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination,9 must be read as constitutional
authorization of affirmative action programs. However, these provisions
must be read in light of the Constitution's founding provisions of non-
racialism and equality92 as well as the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law and prohibition of unfair discrimination.93 For this
reason, the contours of affirmative action programs remain unclear.
The United States Constitution does not expressly endorse affirmative
action, but has been interpreted to permit the use of such programs to remedy
past discrimination.94 However, the use of race-based affirmative action
programs is strictly scrutinized.95 Both the purpose and the means of
88. See supra note 63.
89. S. AR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9.
90. S. AFR. CONST. preamble.
91. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(2).
92. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 1.
93. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9
94. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
95. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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achieving that purpose are closely examined. Although no court has held
that race-conscious decision making is proscribed, strict scrutiny operates as
a rule of presumptive invalidity.9 6 The United States approach to affirmative
action seems to reflect the Supreme Court's interpretation of equal protection
to mean equal opportunity rather than equal achievement. Conversely, the
South African Constitution mandates the promotion of equal achievement as
well as equal opportunity.97
The South African goal of promoting equal achievement is stated in the
founding provisions9" and in the equality clause. 99 This goal supports the use
of affirmative action programs more so than the United States' emphasis on
equal opportunity, which presumes that all individuals are starting from the
same point. In Contrast, equal achievement recognizes that all individuals
do not start from the same point. This is especially true in South Africa,
given its acknowledged history of systematic segregation and discrimination
under the Apartheid system. Therefore, the Constitutional Court must
approach the issue of affirmative action from this perspective, which will
enable the Court to define equality as more than a set of principles to be
applied but also a conceptual ideal to be achieved.
2. Constitutional Recognition of Group Rights
The endorsement of affirmative action in South Africa is also supported
by the Bill of Rights' emphasis on the protection of group rights as well as
individual human rights."0 This dual purpose is demonstrated in the equality
provision which prohibits unfair discrimination "against anyone" and permits
"measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of
persons."'' The right of "cultural, religious and linguistic communities" to
enioy, practice, and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations is
another example of the Constitution's recognition of group rights.'0 2 Group
identity also remains a politically significant factor in South Africa.0 3
Whatever group concerns are recognized by the South African Constitution
96. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, THE LAW GOVERNING THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 239 (1992).
97. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 1; ch. 2, § 9(2).
98. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 1.
99. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(2).
100. Currin & Kruger, supra note 3, at 138.
101. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(2)&(3).
102. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 31.
103. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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will fashion constitutional interpretation and scrutiny of affirmative action
as they do in the United States. The first case decided by the United States
Supreme Court on the issue of race-based affirmative action programs was
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke.1°4 The Court held that the medical
school which Bakke attended violated the Fourteenth Amendment or
applicable statute when it instituted a race-conscious special admissions
program that denied Bakke admission because he was white.'0 5 Justice
Powell announced the Court'sjudgment and focused on individual treatment
rather than group treatment.
10 6
It is more logical to analyze race-based affirmative action programs as
a means of group advancement rather than an infringement on individual
rights. 7 As a minority group, African-Americans have been subjected to
past discrimination which has resulted in their political oppression. 0 8 These
are the issues with which group treatment is concerned.0 9 Therefore,
affirmative action programs that give preferences to African Americans as
a group are easier to justify under a group treatment theory." 0
Focusing on individual rights when assessing the constitutionality of
race-based affirmative action programs, however, can be "fatal.""' The
United States Supreme Court's emphasis on individual guarantees of equal
protection has proven fatal to many race-based programs. 12 The Supreme
Court's latest pronouncement on race-based affirmative action programs, in
Adarand, also emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause protects persons,
not groups." 3 The Court further stressed that racial characteristics rarely
provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment. 114 As a result, all
104. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Dyer, supra note 23,
at 601.
105. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 268.
106. Id. at 287-300; Dyer, supra note 23, at 601.




111. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. "The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is
its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.; Dyer,
supra note 22, at 601.
112. See generally Bakke 438 U.S. at 320; Croson 488 U.S. at 469; Adarand 515 U.S.
at 210.
113. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 210.
114. Id. at 215.
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governmental action based on race, a group classification, should be subject
to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws is not infringed." 5
A group treatment theory based on political powerlessness of minority
racial groups may not apply to the current situation in South Africa. Black
South Africans who lacked access to the political process during Apartheid
now hold the majority of seats in the National Assembly." 6 Therefore, the
implementation of affirmative action programs by the black majority to
benefit themselves may call for greater judicial scrutiny. However, it is
unlikely that in the wake of South Africa's commitment to democratic
values-social justice, fundamental human rights, human dignity, equality and
freedom".7 the current government would make a mockery of the principles
that took a decade to negotiate and implement. The South African
Constitution will adequately protect minorities against unfair discrimination,
because the Constitutional Court will have to apply the same standard of
review for all classifications."'
3. Healing the Divisions of the Past
Affirmative action also serves a constitutional goal of rectifying past
discrimination. Redressing the effects of past discrimination is a
fundamental goal of the South African Constitution. This goal is
incorporated in the preamble to the South African Constitution" 9 and in the
spirit of the Constitution which renounces South Africa's past
"systematically entrenched" inequality. 20
Although the use of affirmative action measures may initially seem
more divisive than healing, it is important to keep in mind South Africa's
historical subjugation of blacks. The problems caused by generations of
general societal discrimination are prevalent throughout every aspect of
South African society. The rifts created by past discrimination are what this
115. Id.
116. Ford, supra note 11, at 1961.
117. S. AFR. CONST. preamble, ch. 1, ch. 2.
118. See supra Part III.C. and infra p. 28.
119. S. AFR. CONST. preamble. "We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the
injustices of our past; . . . We therefore ... adopt this Constitution as the supreme law
of the Republic so as to ... [h]eal the divisions of the past and .. . [i]mprove the quality
of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person."
120. Brink at 33.
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Constitution seeks to "heal." Affirmative action measures are a necessary
means towards this goal.
Redressing general societal discrimination through affirmative action
programs is not a permissible goal for local and state entities in the United
States.' "Congress, [however], may identify and redress the effects of
society-wide discrimination." ' Governmental entities must be redressing
identifiable past discrimination.' The United States Supreme Court
interprets equal protection as a personal right to serve the interest of
consistent application of constitutional standards. 24 However, "an interest
in 'consistency' does not justify treating differences as though they were
similarities."'25 The Court's insistence on consistency seems to defeat the
purpose. Applying different levels of scrutiny to different types of
classifications has an "anomalous" result. '26 The Court makes it easier to
remedy discrimination against women than it is to remedy discrimination
against African Americans, 27 even though the primary purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former slaves.
21
4. Distinguishing Benign from Invidious Discrimination
The goal of equal protection and anti-discrimination policies is to
eliminate decisions made for invidious reasons. 129 Such decision-making
tends to make value judgments about people based on their skin color. 3 0
Affirmative action measures are unlikely to be enacted for invidious
purposes in the United States. Affirmative action programs are implemented
to benefit minority groups who were victims of past discrimination. These
programs are not a means of invidious discrimination against the white
121. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-96.
122. Id. at 490.
123. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. "While the States and their subdivisions may take
remedial action when they possess evidence that their own spending practices are
exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, they must identify that discrimination, public
or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief." Id.
124. Adarand 515 U.S. at 209-12.
125. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
126. Id.; Dyer, supra note 23, at 600.
127. Dyer, supra note 23, at 600.
128. "Many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary
function as bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white
'majority."' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (citing The Slaughter House Cases).
129. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 96, at 239.
130. Id.
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majority, mainly because the normal majoritarian political process will
adequately represent the interests of the burdened majority group. 3' In the
United States benign racial classifications involve a choice by the dominant
racial group to burden itself.' In South Africa, where blacks are the
dominant racial group, this argument for less exacting scrutiny of benign
racial classifications becomes less viable.' 33
The United States Supreme Court's decision inMetro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC"4 distinguished between invidious and benign classification by the
federal government.' In Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that federal
race-based affirmative action programs are to be reviewed under a different
standard than local or state affirmative action measures. 136 Affirmative action
measures adopted by Congress "are constitutionally permissible [if] they
serve [an] important governmental objective within the power of congress
and are substantially related to the achievement of that objective."' 37 This
intermediate level of scrutiny would be applied even if such "measures were
not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past
governmental or societal discrimination."'3 In addition to relying on the
powers of Congress to enforce the Equal Protection Clause,' 39 the Court
implicitly distinguished benign race-conscious programs from those that
burden minorities.
140
But five years later, the Adarand Court declared that the Metro
Broadcasting analysis undermined "the basic principle that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments ... protect persons, not groups.'' Therefore, all
racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized "to ensure that the personal
right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed."' 42 The Court
131. John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CH.
L. REv. 723, 727, 735 (1973-74).
132. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495.
133. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495; Ford, supra note 11, at 2012.
134. Metro Broadcasting, Inc, v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
135. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211.
136. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565.
137. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
138. Id. at 565.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
140. Dietrich, supra note 45, at 1280 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
at 596-97).




reiterated its decision six years earlier in Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,'43
where the Court held that the race of those burdened or benefitted by the
classification is irrelevant to equal protection analysis.' 44 That decision
emphasized that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed individual rights
irrespective of group membership.'45 Furthermore, justification for race-
based measures must be subjected to strict scrutiny in order to differentiate
between benign and invidious classifications.
4 6
However, it is not necessary to apply strict scrutiny to race-based
affirmative action measures to differentiate between invidious and benign
purposes. The difference between good and bad intentions is easily
distinguishable. While it may be easy to disguise bad intentions as
unintended effect of legislation, it would be more difficult to cast invidious
discrimination as an affirmative action program. 147 Furthermore, the level
of scrutiny provided by intermediate review would be sufficient to determine
the purpose behind a race-based affirmative action program.
The intermediate level of scrutiny would also be sufficient to determine
the purpose behind affirmative action legislation in South Africa, despite the
inverted population ratio. For example, if South Africa's black majority
government were to enact an affirmative action policy entitling only black
employees to promotions, the Constitutional Court would likely find such a
program unconstitutional. Analyzing this policy under the interpretive
framework set out above 4 1 would lead to this conclusion without applying
strict scrutiny.
As discussed above, this affirmative action policy will likely be
interpreted as unfair discrimination and therefore a limitation on the right to
equality. 49 However, prior to any analysis under the limitations clause, this
policy must be shown to fall within the terms of section 9(2), the affirmative
action clause. This policy must fail this initial inquiry. Although, this policy
143. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
144. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 208. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
145. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492-94.
146. Id.
147. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. See supra Part III.B.
149. See supra Part III.C.
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may be shown "to promote the achievement of equality" by advancing
persons currently "disadvantaged by unfair discrimination," it is too broad.'
It would be difficult to show that such a broad policy is a "measure
designed' to achieve these purposes.5'
Even if this policy was shown to be an affirmative action program
within the terms of section 9(2), it would still be an impermissible limitation
of the right to equality. According to the limitations clause, the Court must
consider the nature of the right to equality, which is a central right to the
South African Constitution.'52 The importance of the purpose of the
limitation must also be considered.'53 In this case, the promotion policy was
arguably implemented to place blacks into positions which they were
previously denied, which is an important purpose. The purpose of redressing
the effects of past discrimination is also closely related to the promotion
policy.5 4 However, once the extent of the limitation is considered, this
policy becomes problematic. The promotion policy is too broad a limitation
of the right to equality. Finally, the availability of less restrictive means to
achieve the promotion of blacks will prove fatal to this affirmative action
policy.",
IV. CONCLUSION
South African law developed within a socio-political system
characterized by the policy of apartheid and differential treatment based on
race. 5 6 The repercussions of these policies of racial discrimination can still
be felt in South African society. 5 7  South Africa needs to implement
affirmative action measures to remedy the economic and social disparity
between blacks and whites created by Apartheid. 5 '
150. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(2).
151. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(2). Emphasis added.
152. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1)(a).
153. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1)(b).
154. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1)(d).
155. See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 36(1)(e).
156. Jody Kollapen, New Constitution Should Help Transform Our Legal Order, L. H.
R. RTS. 2 (May 1996).
157. See Ford, supra note 11, at 1978-79. "Since the notorious Population Registration
Act was only repealed in 1991, there can be little doubt is most South Africans' minds as
to which persons suffered what precise sort of formal legal disadvantage during the
apartheid year." Id. at 1979.
158. LOURENs Du PLEssis & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 143 (1994).
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The use of strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of race-based
affirmative action measures in the United States has undermined their utility
to achieve racial equality. 5 9  The Court's assertion that there is no
constitutional difference between benign and malicious considerations of
race has turned the Fourteenth Amendment on its head. 6 ° The Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to help African Americans achieve equality, but
is now being used to limit the use of affirmative action as a means to achieve
equality. 6' The only way to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination
is to take race into account.
162
As the above discussion demonstrates, South Africa needs to implement
affirmative action programs to redress the past discrimination experienced
by blacks in South Africa during Apartheid. The South African Constitution
permits such programs both explicitly and implicitly by mandating the
promotion of equal achievement and group rights. 63 However, the inverted
demographics in South Africa and the potential difficulty of differentiating
between benign and invidious discrimination in this situation creates a need
for the Court to apply more than minimal scrutiny. Although the Court
should review potential affirmative action programs, it should not apply the
strict scrutiny standard utilized by the United States Supreme Court. Instead,
the South African Constitutional Court should adopt a standard of review
somewhere in between rational basis review and strict scrutiny. The
Constitutional Court should analyze the constitutionality of potential
affirmative action programs under a level of review akin to intermediate
level scrutiny, which requires that classifications serve an important
governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of
that objective.
The interpretative framework set out by the limitations clause provides
adequate protection against unfair discrimination that violates the rights to
equality and equal protection. The underlying considerations and relevant
factors are clearly set out for the Court to apply. Although the list of factors
is not all inclusive, it is quite comprehensive. South African Constitutional
analysis requires that all limitations advance an important purpose,
regardless of the basis for legislative classifications. In contrast, the level of
159. Dietrich, supra note 45, at 1261.
160. Stephen Reinhardt, Remarks at UCLA Law School Forum on Affirmative Action:
"Where Have You Gone, Jackie Robinson?," 43 UCLA L. REv. 1731, 1731 (1996).
161. Id. at 1733.
162. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, BLACK LIBERATIONA COMPARATIVEHISTORY OF BLACK
IDEOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SouTH AFRICA 320 (1995).
163. See supra Part III.D. 1-2.
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scrutiny applied by the United States Supreme Court depends on the
legislative classification used. Therefore, the level of scrutiny that will be
applied by the Constitutional Court will not depend on the race of those
benefited or burdened."6 The South African requirement that rights be
limited only for an important purpose, correlates more to the United States'
standard for intermediate review than to the compelling state interest
required by strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the relation between the limitation
and its purpose need only be reasonable given the reasonableness
requirement underlying the analysis of justifiable limitations and unfair
discrimination. 6 ' Although a reasonableness requirement corresponds to the
United States' rational relations review, it must be read along with the
additional South African Constitutional mandate to consider the availability
of less restrictive means. This additional inquiry implies that a legislative
measure must be more than rationally related to the purpose sought. Instead,
legislation seeking to limit a constitutional right should be substantially
related to the important purpose it seeks to achieve.
Aliaa Abdelrahman
164. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
165. See supra pp. 10-11 and Part III.C.
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